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COMMENTARY
AI Methods in Bioethics
Joshua August Skorburg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Vincent Conitzer
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
Seemingly every week, new artificial intelligence (AI)
applications are being developed to assist and auto-
mate various forms of medical decision-making.
Examples abound, but some notable instances include
robot-assisted surgery, precision medicine, drug dis-
covery and drug interactions, assessment of suicide
risk from electronic health records or social media
posts, or automated diagnosis on the basis of genetic
sequencing, images, speech, text, and even mouse cur-
sor movements.
In parallel, a new wave of scholarship in bioethics
is exploring the ethical, legal, and social implications
of these AI applications in medicine. This work
focuses, among other areas, on how to protect patient
privacy in the face of the large-scale data collection
required to train AI systems; how AI applications can
reproduce and exacerbate existing biases, and also cre-
ate new forms of inequality; and how increasing reli-
ance on AI technologies may render healthcare less
patient-centered. Again, examples abound, but some
high-profile work in this vein has revealed racial
biases in neural networks trained to identify skin can-
cer (Adamson and Smith 2018). Related research
raises ethical concerns about how new tools, such as
automated speech-based diagnosis of psychopathology,
may perform poorly on non-native English speakers.
Similar work considers the potentially diminished role
of patients’ subjective experiences, in light of prolific
data-mining of health records (Ruckenstein and
Sch€ull 2017).
Crucial as these concerns are, far less attention has
been paid to the role that AI applications might play
in bioethics itself. Might AI improve bioethical
inquiry? Could AI bolster methods in empirical bio-
ethics? In this commentary, we will argue that the
answers to these questions are a cautiously optimistic
“yes” and that empirical bioethicists’ engagement with
AI need not be limited to ethical, legal, and social
implications.
To see this, consider kidney transplants. There are
regrettably not enough donors to supply kidneys to all
of the patients in need. This raises a moral problem.
Who, among many needy patients, should receive a
kidney when one becomes available? These decisions
are often based on features such as compatibility, age,
and time on the waiting list. But there are longstand-
ing debates in bioethics about whether other features
should be considered, and which ethical principles
ought to guide decisions about kidney allocation
(Childress 1989).
To the extent that kidney allocation is increasingly
determined by algorithms, these questions will
demand answers in the form of design choices about
what such algorithms are optimizing for, which fea-
tures are included or excluded, and how they are
weighted. These ethical issues regarding design choices
are right in the empirical bioethicist’s wheelhouse.
Indeed, we have developed a method (Freedman
et al. 2018) for the case of kidney transplants that we
think can also generalize to other issues in bioethics.
In a forthcoming paper, we call this method Artificial
Improved Democracy (AID) (Sinnott-Armstrong and
Skorburg forthcoming).
The first step in this method is to ask experts and lay-
people which features they think ought and ought not
figure into decisions about kidney allocations. Then, after
editing responses for clarity, redundancy, etc., we can use
this curated list of features to construct forced-choice
scenarios in which one (or a set of) valued feature(s) con-
flicts with another (or a set of) valued feature(s).
For example, our results suggest that most laypeo-
ple do think that age and time on the waiting list
should be considered. Most people also think that
race and religion should not be considered. But fea-
tures such as mental health and criminal records are
more controversial (Doyle et al. in prep).
In a controlled experimental setting, we can then ask,
“who should get the kidney?” when Patient A is 34 years
CONTACT Joshua August Skorburg g.skorburg@gmail.com Duke University, Durham, 27708-0187 USA.
 2020 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
AJOB EMPIRICAL BIOETHICS
2020, VOL. 11, NO. 1, 37–39
https://doi.org/10.1080/23294515.2019.1706206
old, with two dependents, and a history of consuming
three alcoholic beverages a day and Patient B is 46 years
old with one dependent and no history of alcohol con-
sumption. After running hundreds and thousands of
these choice trials, we can then use machine learning
techniques to reveal which of the conflicting features
really do seem to drive people’s decisions about kidney
allocations, as well as how different features interact
with one another to produce this decision. On the basis
of these findings, the third step in our method is to
build models to predict individual-level and group-level
decisions. In turn, these predictive models can be itera-
tively improved by being applied to new scenarios.
This method has several advantages. First, we can
compare (in experts and laypeople alike) which fea-
tures people think should be considered in allocating
kidneys. Such information could reveal important dif-
ferences between, for example, the values of doctors
or hospital administrators on the one hand, and the
values of patients or community stakeholders, on the
other. To the extent that participatory research and
patient-centered care (Department of Health 2009) are
guiding ideals, the data collected in our studies can be
used to inform policies to better align healthcare serv-
ices with the values of the patients and communities
utilizing them.
Second, we can compare which features people say
should guide allocation decisions with which features
actually seem to guide their (hypothetical) allocation
decisions. When there is a gap between them, we can
update the model to more closely approximate con-
sensus values. For example, if people consistently say
that race or religion should not be considered when
deciding who gets a kidney, yet in their allocation
decisions these features do seem to play a role (as
reflected in our models of them), then we can update
the models to no longer take these features into
account in order to reflect the consensus.
Third, our method helps to shed light on important
mechanisms of medical decision-making, yielding both
descriptive and explanatory accounts. The more accur-
ate such models become, the more we can understand
the processes driving decisions about kidney alloca-
tions. And the more we understand about these proc-
esses, the better we will be able to guide design choices
to build systems that instantiate both actual human val-
ues and more ideal decision procedures.
For these reasons, we think there is a strong case for
using AI methods in empirical bioethics. The example
of kidney allocation is meant to serve as proof of con-
cept. We think the components of this method (first,
design surveys to discern morally relevant features;
second, construct forced-choice conflict scenarios with
these features; third, iterate predictive models on the
basis of choice data) can generalize to other issues in
empirical bioethics. This is clear enough for closely
related cases, such as liver, lung, or heart transplant pro-
grams. But the method could also be used in cases
involving other limited medical resources, such as
scarce hospital beds or clinicians’ time in critical care
settings. We can imagine other applications in decisions
involving life-sustaining treatments, experimental
therapies, emergency medicine, or end-of-life issues.
To be sure, there are limitations, challenges, and
difficulties which we have not addressed in this short
commentary. But hopefully the foregoing has dem-
onstrated that empirical bioethicists’ engagement
with AI technologies need not be limited to ethical,
legal, and social implications which have tended to
dominate the recent literature. Indeed, if our
research program proves fruitful, then these emerg-
ing AI tools will open new modes of empirical and
normative inquiry—tasks for empirical bioethicists if
there ever were any.
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